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Abstract. In this paper we describe the volunteer computing project SAT@home,
developed and maintained by us. This project is aimed at solving hard instances
of the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT). We believe that this project can be
a useful tool for computational study of inversion problems of some crypto-
graphic functions. In particular we describe a series of experiments performed
in SAT@home on the cryptanalysis of the widely known keystream generator
A5/1. In all experiments we analyzed one known burst (114 bits) of keystream
produced by A5/1. Before the cryptanalysis itself there is a stage on which the
partitioning of the original problem to a family of subproblems is carried out.
Each of subproblems should be easy enough so that it could be solved in rela-
tively small amount of time by volunteer’s PC. We construct such partitioning
using the special technique based on the Monte Carlo method and discrete opti-
mization algorithms for special predictive functions. Besides this in the paper we
describe the technique for reducing inversion problems of cryptographic func-
tions to SAT.
Keywords: Boolean satisfiability problem, SAT, volunteer computing, BOINC, crypt-
analysis, A5/1, SAT@home
1 Introduction
In this paper we present our experience of the development of the volunteer computing
project SAT@home aimed at solving hard instances of the Boolean satisfiability prob-
lem (SAT). In particular this project can be used to justify from the practical point of
view the resistance of some cryptographic functions to attacks based on the algorithms
for solving SAT. We confirm this assertion by successfully solving in SAT@home the
series of cryptanalysis problems of widely known keystream generator A5/1, based on
one known burst (114 bits) of keystream.
The Boolean satisfiability problem is formulated as follows: for an arbitrary Boolean
formula to determine if there exists such assignment of its variables, that makes this
formula true. This problem is NP-complete, and if P 6= NP there are no polynomial
algorithms that could solve it. On the other hand, the class of practically important
problems that can be effectively reduced to SAT is very wide [3]. Because of this fact
it is important to develop the algorithms that show good effectiveness in application to
various cases of SAT.
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In practice it is usually convenient to consider satisfiability problem for a formula
presented in the Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). Using the Tseitin transformations
[41] it is possible to effectively (in polynomial time) reduce the SAT for an arbitrary
Boolean formula to the SAT for some CNF.
In the last 10 years the effectiveness of SAT solving algorithms has significantly in-
creased. Today SAT approach is used to solve various problems from the areas of sym-
bolic verification, bioinformatics, discrete optimization, combinatorial design, crypt-
analysis, etc. There are several basic classes of algorithms used to construct modern
SAT solvers. All the results presented in this paper were obtained using the so called
Conflict Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) solvers, the description of main architectural
principles of which can be found, for example, in [28].
To solve SAT instances encoding the problems of cryptanalysis of ciphering sys-
tems used in the real world it is insufficient to employ only the resources of a single PC.
In this context the development of SAT solving methods, designed for parallel and dis-
tributed computing environments, is highly relevant. There are several general concepts
of solving SAT in parallel. From our point of view for solving SAT instances, encod-
ing cryptographic attacks, the volunteer computing concept looks promising, because
this kind of distributed computing makes it possible to solve one particular computing
problem for a prolonged time with relatively high performance (on average).
It should be noted, that when solving a particular problem in a volunteer computing
project there apply some restrictions. First, the problem should be divided into subprob-
lems in such a way that each subproblem can be solved by a volunteer’s PC in relatively
small amount of time (several hours at most). Also it is worth mentioning that volunteers
PCs do not interconnect directly with each other. From these restrictions it is natural to
draw the conclusion that to parallelize the original problem it is best to use the parti-
tioning approach. The partitioning method must make it possible to estimate the time
required to solve all produced subproblems. Below we describe such method and apply
it to the parallelization of cryptanalysis problems for the widely known keystream gen-
erator A5/1. Then we process the partitionings obtained in parallel using the volunteer
computing project SAT@home.
Let us give a brief outline of the paper. In the second section we present the general
technique used to reduce cryptographic problems to SAT and describe the TRANSALG
program system implementing this technique. In the third section we give brief descrip-
tion of main SAT solving algorithms that we applied to cryptographic problems. In the
fourth section we propose an approach to the parallelization of SAT instances that en-
code cryptanalysis problems. Thus, we describe the general technique of constructing
SAT partitionings that can be processed in distributed computing environments. In the
fifth section we present the results of the computational experiments on the search for
SAT partitionings, with the use of the algorithms described in the previous section. In
the sixth section we describe the volunteer computing project SAT@home developed
by us specifically for the purpose of solving hard SAT instances, and present the results
of computational experiments held in SAT@home on the cryptanalysis of the A5/1
keystream generator.
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2 Reducing Inversion Problems of Cryptographic Functions to
SAT
Hereinafter by {0, 1}l we denote the set formed by all possible binary words of length l.
By f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m we denote a discrete function that transforms binary words
of length n to binary words of lengthm. For each function considered below we assume
that this function is defined everywhere on {0, 1}n and is specified by some algorithm
A. By Range f , Range f ⊆ {0, 1}m we denote the set of all output values of the
function f . Let us consider the following problem: for a given y ∈ Range f and the
known algorithm A we need to find such x ∈ {0, 1}n, that f(x) = y. We will refer to
this general problem as to the problem of inversion of function f . Many cryptanalysis
problems can be considered in its context. For example, let f be a function specified by
the algorithm of some keystream generator. Then x ∈ {0, 1}n is the secret key and y ∈
{0, 1}m : f(x) = y is the keystream produced by the generator considered. In the vast
majority of keystream ciphers the ciphertext is formed by adding keystream and some
secret message M in arithmetics modulo 2. Sometimes, it is possible (usually when
the protocol is inconsistent) that some message M becomes known. It may represent
some technical data and thus not even contain any valuable information (as in case of
the ciphering protocol used in the GSM standard). However, if we know M and the
corresponding ciphertext then we can find y and consider the problem of search for the
secret key x : f(x) = y. Knowing x makes it possible to read any message ciphered
using this secret key. The problem of determining x based on a given y and known
algorithm specifying function f is usually called a known plaintext attack. Hereinafter
we will study this particular cryptographic problem.
2.1 Theoretical Basis of SAT Encoding of Discrete Functions Inversion Problems
Let us describe the general scheme of encoding the problem of inversion of f to SAT.
The main idea that underlies such reductions is based on the Cook theorem [8]. It con-
sists in forming a correspondence between the computation of function f by algorithm
A and some system of Boolean equations. The complexity of the procedure that con-
structs the system of Boolean equations is bounded above by a polynomial of the com-
plexity of algorithm A.
In more detail the transition from the problem of inversion of f to the CNF encoding
looks as follows. By S(f) we denote the Boolean Circuit over the basis {∧,¬} that
implements function f . In the circuit S(f) there are n inputs and m outputs. Let us
link Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn, forming the set X , with inputs of the circuit, and
Boolean variables y1, . . . , ym, forming the set Y , with its outputs. We also mark each
logical gateG by an auxiliary variable v(G) such that v(G) /∈ X . The set of all auxiliary
variables we denote by V . Note that Y ⊆ V . Let v(G) be an arbitrary variable from
V and G be a corresponding gate. If G is a NOT-gate and u ∈ X
⋃
V is the variable
linked with the input ofG then we encode the gateG with the Boolean formula v(G) ≡
¬u (hereinafter by ≡ we mean logical equivalence). If G is an AND-gate and u,w ∈
X
⋃
V are variables linked with the gate inputs then we encode G with the formula
v(G) ≡ u∧w. CNF-representations of Boolean functions specified by formulas v(G) ≡
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¬u and v(G) ≡ u ∧ v look as follows (respectively):
(v(G) ∨ u) ∧ (¬v(G) ∨ ¬u)
(v(G) ∨ ¬u ∨ ¬w) ∧ (¬v(G) ∨ u) ∧ (¬v(G) ∨ w)
(1)
Thus with an arbitrary gate G of circuit S(f) we associate a CNF C(G) of the kind (1).
We will say that the CNF C(G) encodes the gate G, and the CNF
C(f) =
∧
G∈S(f)
C(G)
encodes the circuit S(f). The described technique of constructing a CNF for a circuit
S(f) is known as Tseitin transformations [41].
Now let (β1, . . . , βm) ∈ {0, 1}m be an arbitrary assignment of variables y1, . . . , ym.
Consider the CNF
C(f) ∧ yβ11 ∧ . . . ∧ y
βm
m (2)
where
yβ =
{
¬y, if β = 0
y, if β = 1
From the properties of the Tseitin transformations it follows that if (β1, . . . , βm) ∈
Range f then the CNF (2) is satisfiable and from any of its satisfying assignments
one can effectively extract such assignment x1 = α1, . . . , xn = αn, αi ∈ {0, 1},
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that f (α1, . . . , αn) = (β1, . . . , βm).
Thus, using the technique described above we reduce the problem of inversion of
function f in an arbitrary point y ∈ Rangef to SAT for the CNF (2). It makes it
possible to apply the SAT solvers to the latter problem.
2.2 Encoding Inversion Problems of Cryptographic Functions to SAT Using the
Transalg System
In this section we will briefly describe the TRANSALG program system [34] that was de-
signed specifically to reduce inversion problems of cryptographic functions to SAT. The
original function f should first be represented in the form of the special TA-program
A. TA-programs have C-like syntax. The translation of an arbitrary TA-program A es-
sentially involves the symbolic execution of A [26], and results in the propositional
encoding of A in the form of CNF. In other words the result of compilation of the
program A is not a machine code but a set of Boolean formulas constructed accord-
ing to the Tseitin transformations. In more detail, the result of the compilation of the
TA-program is the CNF C(f) encoding the circuit S(f). By fixing the values of output
variables (β1, . . . , βm) (essentially transitioning to CNF (2)) we obtain a SAT instance
that encodes the inversion problem of function f in the point y = (β1, . . . , βm).
Below the main object of our study is the A5/1 keystream generator that has been
used to encrypt data within the GSM standard for more than 15 years. On Figure 1 we
demonstrate the scheme of the A5/1 generator from the paper [4].
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Fig. 1. The A5/1 keystream generator
The generator contains three linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) specified by
the following feedback polynomials:
LFSR1 X19 +X18 +X17 +X14 + 1;
LFSR2 X22 +X21 + 1;
LFSR3 X23 +X22 +X21 +X8 + 1.
The registers in A5/1 are shifted asynchronously. Assume that at the initial time
moment t = 0 the registers contain the secret key. By bti, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the value
of the clocking bit of the i-th register at time moment t. The clocking bits are contained
in cells 9, 30 and 52. With each clocking bit the special function
τi(t) =
{
1, if majority (b1(t), b2(t), b3(t)) = bi(t)
0, if majority (b1(t), b2(t), b3(t)) 6= bi(t)
is associated. Here majority (A,B,C) = (A∧B)∨ (A∧C)∨ (B ∧C). The register
number i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is shifted at time moment t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} only if τi(t) = 1.
Otherwise the register retains the condition in which it was at the previous time moment.
At each time moment the generator outputs one bit of keystream that is produced as a
sum modulo 2 of bits contained in cells 19, 41 and 64. The length of the secret key in
the A5/1 keystream generator is 64 bits.
On Figure 2 we present the TA-program specifying the discrete function
fA5/1 : {0, 1}
64 → {0, 1}114. (3)
This function generates 114 bits of keystream from the secret key of length 64 bits
according to the A5/1 algorithm. The length of keystream fragment is chosen to be
equal to 114 bits because in the GSM standard the information is encrypted by blocks
of 114 bits. Such blocks are called bursts.
The result of the compilation of the program from the Figure 2 is the CNF with
7816 variables and 35568 clauses (size of the file in DIMACS format is 730 kilobytes).
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define len 114 
__in bit regA[19]; 
__in bit regB[22]; 
__in bit regC[23]; 
__out bit stream[len]; 
int midA = 8; 
int midB = 10; 
int midC = 10; 
 
bit majority(bit x, bit y, bit z){ 
  return x & y | x & z | y & z; 
} 
 
void main(){ 
  for(int i = 0; i < len; i = i + 1){ 
    bit maj = majority(regA[midA],regB[midB],regC[midC]);
    if(!(maj^regA[midA])) shift_regA(); 
    if(!(maj^regB[midB])) shift_regB(); 
    if(!(maj^regC[midC])) shift_regC(); 
    stream[i] = regA[18]^regB[21]^regC[22]; 
  } 
} 
Fig. 2. TA-program specifying function fA5/1.
3 Algorithms for Solving SAT Instances that Encode Inversion
Problems of Cryptographic Functions
Main classes of the SAT solving algorithms were extensively described in [3]. After
many computational experiments we made the conclusion that the algorithms based on
the concept of Conflict Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) [28] perform best on crypto-
graphic problems. All the modern CDCL solvers that show good effectiveness on wide
classes of industrial tests are based on the DPLL algorithm [9]. However, in its pure
form the DPLL algorithm has relatively low performance. The main idea of the CDCL
concept is to complement the DPLL with an ability to use memory to store the infor-
mation about traversed parts of the search tree. This information is stored in the form
of restrictive constraints which are called conflict clauses. The solver GRASP [29] was
the first full-fledged CDCL solver. In the subsequent papers [45,33] several important
algorithmical constructions were described that made it possible to improve the CDCL
concept. It led to the creation of SAT solvers widely applied nowadays to combinatorial
problems from various areas.
Active development of parallel SAT solving algorithms started quite recently. First
parallel SAT solvers competition was held in 2008. There are two main approaches to
parallel SAT solving: the partitioning approach and the portfolio approach. In the parti-
tioning approach the search space is divided into separate subspaces that are processed
in parallel. In the portfolio approach all computing processes work with the same origi-
nal search space, but they use different initial parameters and search heuristics, and also
can share the collected data with each other.
The SAT instances encoding the inversion problems of cryptographic functions used
in the real world usually are very hard, and to solve them it is insufficient to use the
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resources of a usual PC. The graphical processors (GPU) in the context of solving SAT
nowadays do not yield any advantages in comparison with traditional CPUs. That is
explained by the fact that modern GPUs have relatively high memory latencies, which
significantly decrease the performance of CDCL algorithms.
For solving hard SAT instances one can use computing clusters with nodes based on
CPUs. The portfolio approach makes it impossible to effectively utilize a large number
of cluster nodes because intensive conflict clauses exchange greatly taxes the inter-
connection environment. The advantage of the partitioning approach is that it doesn’t
limit the amount of computating nodes of the cluster that can be used. The low inten-
sity of data exchange between computing processes in this case makes it possible to
employ not only computing clusters but also distributed computing systems. The use
of such systems (including volunteer computing projects) suits better for solving hard
SAT instances because of the low computing costs (in comparison to that of clusters).
To organize the computations in the distributed system the original problem should be
divided into a family of significantly less complex subproblems in such a way that each
subproblem can be solved by a computing node (such as, for example, a usual PC) in
relatively small amount of time. In the next section we will describe the SAT partition-
ing technique that we used to organize the computations in grid systems.
4 Partitioning Procedures for SAT Instances Encoding Inversion
Problems of Cryptographic Functions
So as we explained above we use the partitioning approach to parallelize the SAT solv-
ing process. There exist many various ways of constructing SAT partitionings [19].
Moreover, even following one way it is possible to make several different partitionings
for the same SAT instance. The main problem that arises in this context is to justify why
one partitioning is better than another. The basic partitioning effectiveness criterion is
the time required to process it in a distributed computing environment. Unfortunately,
not for all types of SAT partitionings it is possible to evaluate their effectiveness. In
this section we will describe one type of SAT partitioning for which there exists quite
natural procedure for constructing estimations of time required to process it. We used
this type of partitioning to solve inversion problems of some cryptographic functions in
parallel.
Assume that C is the CNF encoding the inversion problem of some discrete func-
tion. By X denote the set of Boolean variables that appear in CNF C. By X˜ denote
an arbitrary subset of X . Let α be an arbitrary set of values of variables from X˜ . By
C
[
X˜/α
]
we denote the CNF produced fromC by setting values from α to correspond-
ing variables. Let us consider the set ∆
(
C, X˜
)
=
{
C
[
X˜/α
]}
α∈{0,1}|X˜|
. It is easy to
see that the CNF C is satisfiable if and only if at least one CNF from the set ∆
(
C, X˜
)
is satisfiable. Therefore, the set ∆
(
C, X˜
)
is a partitioning of the SAT instance C [19].
We call the set X˜ that produces the partitioning ∆
(
C, X˜
)
a decomposition set.
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Now let us describe the approach to constructing time estimations for the processing
of SAT partitionings that was proposed in [37]. First let us fix some particular SAT
solving algorithm A. Hereinafter we assume that A is a complete algorithm, i.e. it has
finite runtime for an arbitrary input. Now consider an arbitrary CNF C over the set
X of Boolean variables. Let X˜ be an arbitrary decomposition set. Consider the set
{0, 1}|X˜|. Let us define the uniform distribution on this set. With a randomly selected
vector α ∈ {0, 1}|X˜| we associate the runtime of algorithm A given the CNF C
[
X˜/α
]
as an input. This time can be considered as a value of some random variable which we
denote below as ξA
(
C, X˜
)
. Since A is a complete algorithm, then the random variable
ξA
(
C, X˜
)
takes only finite values with some probabilities. Thus, the expected value
of ξA
(
C, X˜
)
is finite. By tA
(
C, X˜
)
denote the time required to process the SAT
partitioning ∆
(
C, X˜
)
sequentially by algorithm A. In [37] it was shown that under
listed conditions the following equality holds:
tA
(
C, X˜
)
= 2|X˜| · E
[
ξA
(
C, X˜
)]
(4)
To estimate the expected value E
[
ξA
(
C, X˜
)]
it is possible to use the computa-
tional scheme of the Monte Carlo method in its classical form [32]. Namely, for an
arbitrary decomposition set X˜ we randomly select vectors α1, . . . , αN from {0, 1}|X˜|.
Then for each αj , j ∈ {1, . . . , N} we measure the time required by algorithm A to
solve the SAT for CNF C
[
X˜/αj
]
. We denote the time obtained by ξj . After this we
compute the value 1N ·
N∑
j=1
ξj . In accordance with the theoretical basis of the Monte
Carlo method [32,24], when N is large enough, the value 1N ·
N∑
j=1
ξj becomes a good
estimation of the expected value E
[
ξA
(
C, X˜
)]
. Therefore it follows from (4) that the
value
FA
(
C, X˜
)
=
2|X˜|
N
·
N∑
j=1
ξj (5)
is the estimation of time required by algorithmA to sequentially process the whole SAT
partitioning ∆
(
C, X˜
)
and this estimation is the more accurate the larger N is. Below
we will refer to the function defined according to (5) as to the predictive function.
As we already noted above, different partitionings of the same SAT problem can
have different values of tA
(
C, X˜
)
. In practice it is important to be able to find parti-
tionings that can be processed in affordable time. Below we will describe a scheme of
automatic search for good partitionings that is based on the procedure minimizing the
predictive function value in a special search space.
So we consider the satisfiability problem for some CNF C. Let X = {x1, . . . , xM}
be a set of all Boolean variables in this CNF and X˜ ⊆ X be an arbitrary decomposition
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set. The set X˜ can be represented by the binary vector χ = (χ1, . . . , χM ). Here
χi =
{
1, if xi ∈ X˜
0, if xi /∈ X˜
, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
With an arbitrary vector χ ∈ {0, 1}M we associate the value of function F (χ) com-
puted in the following manner. For vector χ we construct the corresponding set X˜ (it
is formed by variables from X that correspond to 1 positions in χ). Then we generate
a random sample {α1, . . . , αN}, αj ∈ {0, 1}|X˜| and solve SAT for CNFs C
[
X˜/αj
]
.
For each of these SAT instances we measure ξj — the runtime of algorithm A on the
input C
[
X˜/αj
]
. After this we calculate the value of FA
(
C, X˜
)
according to (5). As
a result we have the value of F (χ) in the considered point of the search space.
Now we will solve the problem F (χ) → min over the set {0, 1}M . Of course,
the problem of search for the exact minimum of function F (χ) is extraordinarily com-
plex. Therefore our main goal is to find in affordable time the points in {0, 1}M with
relatively good values of function F (·). For this purpose we propose two minimiza-
tion algorithms. The first employs the simulated annealing algorithm, while the second
is based on the tabu search concept. We will compare the effectiveness of these al-
gorithms on the example of the problem of search for the good SAT partitioning for
the SAT instances encoding the cryptanalysis of the A5/1 keystream generator (i.e. the
inversion problem of (3)).
First we need to introduce the notation. By ℜ we denote the search space, for exam-
ple, ℜ = {0, 1}M , however, as we will see later, for the problems considered one can
use the search spaces of much less power. The minimization of function F (·) is consid-
ered as an iterative process of transitioning between the points of the search space:
χ0 → χ1 → . . .→ χi → . . .→ χ∗.
By Nρ (χ) we denote the neighborhood of point χ of radius ρ in the search space ℜ.
The point from which the search starts we denote as χstart. The current Best Known
Value of F (·) is denoted by Fbest. The point in which the Fbest was achieved we denote
as χbest. By χcenter we denote the point the neighborhood of which is processed at
the current moment. We call the point, in which we computed the value F (·) a checked
point. The neighborhood Nρ (χ) in which all the points are checked is called checked
neighborhood. Otherwise the neighborhood is called unchecked.
According to the scheme of the simulated annealing [27], the transition from χi to
χi+1 is performed in two stages. First we choose a point χ˜i from Nρ
(
χi
)
. The point
χ˜i becomes the point χi+1 with the probability denoted as Pr
{
χ˜i → χi+1|χi
}
. This
probability is defined in the following way:
Pr
{
χ˜i → χi+1|χi
}
=


1, if F
(
χ˜i
)
< F
(
χi
)
exp
(
−
F(χ˜i)−F(χi)
Ti
)
, if F
(
χ˜i
)
≥ F
(
χi
)
In the pseudocode of the algorithm demonstrated below the function that tests if the
point χ˜i becomes χi+1, is called PointAccepted (this function returns the value of
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true if the transition occurs and false otherwise). The change of parameter Ti cor-
responds to decreasing the “temperature of the environment” [27] (in the pseudocode
by decreaseTemperature() we denote the function which implements this proce-
dure). Usually it is assumed that Ti = Q · Ti−1, i ≥ 1, where Q ∈ (0, 1). The process
starts at some initial value T0 and continues until the temperature drops below some
threshold value Tinf (in the pseudocode the function that checks this condition is called
temperatureLimitReached()).
Algorithm 1: Simulated annealing algorithm for minimization of the predictive
function
Input: CNF C, initial point χstart
Output: Pair 〈χbest, Fbest〉, where Fbest is a prediction for C, χbest is a corresponding
decomposition set
1 〈χcenter, Fbest〉 ← 〈χstart, F (χstart)〉
2 repeat
3 bestValueUpdated← false
4 ρ = 1
5 repeat // check neighborhood
6 χ← any unchecked point from Nρ(χcenter)
7 compute F (χ)
8 mark χ as checked point in Nρ(χcenter)
9 if PointAccepted(χ) then
10 〈χbest, Fbest〉 ← 〈χ, F (χ)〉
11 χcenter ← χbest
12 bestValueUpdated← true
13 if (Nρ(χcenter) is checked) and (not bestValueUpdated) then
14 ρ = ρ+ 1
15 decreaseTemperature()
16 until bestValueUpdated
17 until timeExceeded() or temperatureLimitReached()
18 return 〈χbest, Fbest〉
In the other approach to the minimization of F (·) we employed the tabu search
scheme [14]. According to this approach the points from the search space, in which we
already calculated the values of function F (·) are stored in special tabu lists. When we
try to improve the current Best Known Value of F (·) in the neighborhood of some point
χcenter then for an arbitrary point χ from the neighborhood we first check if we haven’t
computed F (χ) earlier. If we haven’t and, therefore, the point χ is not contained in tabu
lists, then we compute F (χ). This strategy is justified in the case of the minimization
of predictive function F (·) because the computing of values of the function in some
points of the search space is very expensive. The use of tabu lists makes it possible to
significantly increase the number of points of the search space processed per time unit.
Let us describe the Tabu Search algorithm (TS-algorithm) for minimization F (·) in
more detail. To store the information about points, in which we already computed the
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value of F (·) we use two tabu lists L1 and L2. The L1 list contains only points with
checked neighborhoods. The L2 list contains checked points with unchecked neighbor-
hoods. Below we present the pseudocode of the TS-algorithm for F (·) minimization.
Algorithm 2: Tabu search altorithm for minimization of the predictive function
Input: CNF C, initial point χstart
Output: Pair 〈χbest, Fbest〉, where Fbest is a prediction for C, χbest is a corresponding
decomposition set
1 〈χcenter, Fbest〉 ← 〈χstart, F (χstart)〉
2 〈L1, L2〉 ← 〈∅, χstart〉 // initialize tabu lists
3 repeat
4 bestValueUpdated← false
5 repeat // check neighborhood
6 χ← any unchecked point from Nρ(χcenter)
7 compute F (χ)
8 markPointInTabuLists(χ, L1, L2) // update tabu lists
9 if F (χ) < Fbest then
10 〈χbest, Fbest〉 ← 〈χ, F (χ)〉
11 bestValueUpdated← true
12 until Nρ(χcenter) is checked
13 if bestValueUpdated then χcenter ← χbest
14 else χcenter ← getPoint(L2)
15 until timeExceeded() or L2 = ∅
16 return 〈χbest, Fbest〉
In this algorithm the function markPointInTabuLists(χ,L1, L2) adds the point
χ to L2 and then marks χ as checked in all neighborhoods of points from L2 that con-
tain χ. If as a result the neighborhood of some point χ′ becomes checked, the point χ′
is removed from L2 and is added to L1. If we have processed all the points in the neigh-
borhood of χcenter but could not improve the Fbest then as the new point χcenter we
choose some point from L2. It is done via the function getPoint(L2). To choose the
new point in this case one can use various heuristics. At the moment the TS-algorithm
employs the following heuristics: it chooses the point for which the total conflict ac-
tivity of Boolean variables, contained in the corresponding decomposition set, is the
largest.
As we already mentioned above, taking into account the features of the considered
SAT problems makes it possible to significantly decrease the size of the search space.
For example, knowing the so called Backdoor Sets [42] can help in that matter. In
case of the SAT instances encoding the inversion problems of functions of the kind
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m the set X˜in formed by the variables encoding the inputs of
the Boolean circuit S(f) is the so called Strong Unit Propagation Backdoor Set [22].
It means that if we use X˜in as a decomposition set, then the CDCL solver will solve
SAT for any CNF of the kind C
[
X˜in/α
]
, α ∈ {0, 1}|X˜in| on the preprocessing stage,
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i.e. very fast. Therefore the point χin that corresponds to the set X˜in can be used as an
initial point in the predictive function minimization procedure. Moreover, it is possible
to reduce the search space to the set 2X˜in . In all our computational experiments we
followed this path.
5 Computing Cluster Implementation of the Monte Carlo
Algorithms for Constructing SAT Partitionings
The minimization algorithms suggested above were implemented as a parallel MPI-
program PDSAT [37]. In PDSAT there is one leader process, all the other are follower
processes (each process corresponds to 1 CPU core).The leader process in the PDSAT
program selects point χ of the search space and creates random sample {α1, . . . , αN}.
Follower processes solve corresponding SAT instances of the kind C
[
X˜/αj
]
, j ∈
{1, . . . , N} (see section 4). The value of predictive function is always computed as-
suming that all the subproblems from the partitioning ∆
(
C, X˜
)
will be processed by
1 CPU core.
We considered the inversion problem of the function (3): given the 114 bits of
keystream we needed to find the secret key of length 64 bits, which produces this
keystream (in accordance with the A5/1 algorithm). The PDSAT program was used
to find partitionings with good time estimations for CNFs encoding this problem. The
computational experiments were performed on the computing cluster Blackford ISDCT
SB RAS1 –– in each experiment PDSAT was launched for 1 day using 16 Intel Xeon
5345 EM64T CPUs (64 cores in total). We used random samples of size N = 104.
On Figures 3, 4, 5 three decompositions sets are shown. We described the first set
(further referred to as S1) in the paper [38] earlier. This set (of 31 variables) was con-
structed “manually” based on the analysis of algorithmic features of the A5/1 generator.
The second one (S2), consisting of 31 variables, was found as a result of the minimiza-
tion of F (·) by the simulated annealing algorithm (see section 4). The third set (S3),
consisting of 32 variables, was found as a result of minimization of F (·) by the TS
algorithm. In the table 1 the values of F (·) (in seconds) for all three sets are shown.
Note that each of sets S2 and S3 was found for one 114 bit fragment of keystream that
was generated according to the A5/1 algorithm for a randomly chosen 64-bit secret key.
Table 1. Decomposition sets fot the A5/1 cryptanalysis problem and corresponding values of the
predictive function.
Set Power of set F (·)
S1 31 4.45140e+08
S2 31 4.78318e+08
S3 32 4.64428e+08
1 http://hpc.icc.ru/
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Fig. 3. Decomposition set S1
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Fig. 4. Decomposition set S2
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Fig. 5. Decomposition set S3
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6 Cryptanalysis of the A5/1 Keystream Generator in the Volunteer
Computing Project SAT@home
Volunteer computing [10] is a type of distributed computing which uses computational
resources of PCs of private persons called volunteers. Each volunteer computing project
is designed to solve one or several hard problems. When PC is connected to the project,
all the calculations are performed automatically and do not inconvenience user since
only idle resources of PC are used.
The first volunteer project was the GIMPS2 project launched in 1996. Nowadays the
most popular platform for organizing volunteer computing projects is BOINC [2] that
was developed in Berkeley in 2002. Today there are about 70 active volunteer projects,
the majority of them based on BOINC. The total performance of these projects exceeds
10 petaflops. Among the most important results obtained via volunteer computing are
the discoveries of the largest prime number in the GIMPS project and of several ra-
diopulsars in the Einstein@home3 project.
Volunteer computing project consists of the following basic parts: server daemons,
database, web site and client application. Client application should have versions for the
widespread computing platforms. One of the attractive features of volunteer computing
is its low cost — to maintatin a project one needs only a dedicated server working 24/7.
Another advantage of this type of computing is that volunteer project can solve some
particular hard problem for months or even years with good average performance.
SAT@home4 [35] is volunteer computing project aimed at solving hard combina-
torial problems that can be effectively reduced to SAT. It was launched on September
29, 2011 by ISDCT SB RAS and IITP RAS. SAT@home was developed with the help
of BOINC platform [2] and SZTAKI Desktop Grid package [23]. On February 7, 2012
SAT@home was added to the official list of BOINC projects5 with alpha status. Re-
cently its status was improved to beta.
The SAT@home server uses a number of standard BOINC daemons responsible
for sending and processing tasks (transitioner, feeder, scheduler, etc.). Such daemons
as work generator, validator and assimilator were implemented taking into account the
specificity of the project. The work generator decomposes the original SAT problem to
subproblems according to the partitioning approach (see section 4). It creates 2 copies
of each task in accordance with the concept of redundant calculations used in BOINC.
The validator checks the correctness of the results, and the assimilator processes correct
results. The client application is based on the SAT solver MINISAT [11].
The characteristics of the SAT@home project as of 12 of November 2014 are (ac-
cording to BOINCstats6):
– 3113 active PCs (active PC in volunteer computing is a PC that sent at least one
result in last 30 days) about 80% of them use Microsoft Windows OS;
– 1337 active users (active user is a user that has at least one active PC);
2 http://www.mersenne.org/
3 http://einstein.phys.uwm.edu/
4 http://sat.isa.ru/pdsat/
5 http://boinc.berkeley.edu/projects.php
6 http://boincstats.com/
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– versions of the client application for CPU: Windows x86, Windows x86-64, Linux
x86, Linux x86-64;
– average real performance: 3.2 teraflops, maximal performance: 7.9 teraflops.
The dynamics of the real performance of SAT@home can be seen at the SAT@home
performance page7.
The experiment consisting in solving 10 inversion problems of function fA5/1 was
held in SAT@home from December 2011 to May 2012. To construct the corresponding
tests we used the known rainbow-tables for the A5/1 algorithm8. These tables provide
about 88% probability of success when analyzing 8 bursts of keystream (i.e. 914 bits).
We randomly generated 1000 problems and applied the rainbow-tables technique to
analyze 8 bursts of keystream, generated by A5/1. Among these 1000 problems the
rainbow-tables could not find the secret key for 125 problems. From these 125 prob-
lems we randomly chose 10 and in the computational experiments applied the SAT
approach to the analysis of first bursts of the corresponding keystream fragments (114
bits). For each SAT instance we constructed the partitioning generated by the S1 decom-
position set (see Figure 3) and processed it in the SAT@home project. All 10 instances
constructed this way were successfully solved in SAT@home in about 5 months (the
average performance of the project at that time was about 2 teraflops). After finding the
satisfying assignment the processing of the corresponding partitioning was interrupted.
On average to solve one SAT instance the SAT@home project had to process about 1
billion subproblems from the corresponding partitioning.
The second experiment on the cryptanalysis of A5/1 was launched in SAT@home
in May 2014. It was done with the purpose of testing the decomposition sets found
automatically with the help of the procedures described in section 4. In particular we
took the decomposition set S3 (see Figure 5) that was constructed for the SAT instance
encoding the cryptanalysis of one particular 114-bit A5/1 keystream fragment, and then
used this set to solve the series of tests with 10 similar instances. On September 26 we
successfully solved in SAT@home all 10 instances from the considered series. It should
be noted that in all the experiments the time required to solve the problem agrees with
the predictive function value computed for the S3 decomposition set.
The problem of cryptanalysis of the generator A5/1 is also interesting because the
same keystream of an arbitrary length can be generated from different secret keys. This
fact was noted by Jovan Golic in [15]. We refer to these situations as “collisions” us-
ing the evident analogy with the corresponding notion from the theory of hash func-
tions. The approach presented in our paper allows us to solve the problem of finding
all the collisions of the generator A5/1 for a given fragment of a keystream. Using the
SAT@home project collisions for several SAT instance were found (see Table 2).
Our computational experiments clearly demonstrate that the proposed method of
automatic search for decomposition sets makes it possible to construct SAT partition-
ings with the properties close to that of “reference” partitionings, i.e. partitionings con-
structed based on the analysis of algorithmic features of the considered cryptographic
functions.
7 http://sat.isa.ru/pdsat/performance.php
8 https://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/a51-decrypt
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Table 2. Original keys and collisions of the generator A5/1 (in hexadecimal format)
instance original secret key collision
1 F43FF04CD4F45660 7A1FF04CD4F45660
2 B95654F2242C6DF1 5CAB34F2242C6DF1
3 67685940B034EF78 B3B43940B034EF78
4 41038717BBA05E57 FB164EC44124398E
7 Related Works
In the book [3] the Boolean satisfiability problem is considered in the variety of aspects.
The problems regarding the organization of the SAT solving process in distributed com-
puting environments have been studied in [44,6,20,7,18,19]. The partitioning approach
was analyzed in detail in [20,21,19]. A number of approaches to estimating the runtime
for Constraint Satisfaction Problem and SAT can be found in [1,25,17,43].
The first example of the application of the SAT approach to the cryptanalysis prob-
lems is [30]. In [31,12,40,39] several estimations of time required to solve SAT for
CNFs encoding the Bivium cipher cryptanalysis were proposed. The ideas underlying
the cited works are close to the ones we use. The main distinction between our results
and that of [31,12,40,39] is that the decomposition sets that were constructed in those
papers were found based on either the structure of the encryption algorithm or ran-
domly. Our main achievement consists in constructing automatic procedures to solve
this problem.
The most effective in practice method of cryptanalysis of A5/1 is the Rainbow-
method, partial description of which can be found on the A5/1 Cracking Project site9.
In [16] the description of a number of techniques, used in the A5/1 Cracking Project
to construct Rainbow tables, was presented. The cryptanalysis of A5/1 via Rainbow
tables has the success rate of approximately 88% if one uses 8 bursts of keystream. The
success rate of the Rainbow method if one has only 1 burst of keystream is about 24%.
In all our computational experiments we analyzed the keystream fragment of size 114
bits, i.e. one burst. In [38] we described our first experience on the application of the
SAT approach to A5/1 cryptanalysis in the specially constructed grid system BNB-Grid.
The decomposition set used in [38] was constructed manually based on the peculiarities
of the A5/1 algorithm.
The grid systems aimed at solving SAT are relatively rare. In [36] a desktop grid for
solving SAT which used conflict clauses exchange via a peer-to-peer protocol was de-
scribed. Apparently, [5] became the first paper about the use of a desktop grid based on
the BOINC platform for solving SAT. Unfortunately, it did not evolve into a full-fledged
volunteer computing project. As we noted above, the predecessor of the SAT@home
was the BNB-Grid system [13,38], that was used to solve first large scale cryptographic
problems in 2009.
9 https://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/a51-decrypt
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8 Conclusions
In the present paper we describe the volunteer computing project SAT@home designed
specifically for the purpose of long-term solving of hard SAT instances. We also pro-
pose the partitioning method for SAT instances encoding inversion problems of cryp-
tographic functions. The applicability of proposed technologies is demonstrated on the
problem of cryptanalysis of the A5/1 keystream generator. In the SAT@home project
we managed to solve several cryptanalysis instances for this generator. In all the exper-
iments we analyzed only the first burst (114 bits) of keystream.
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